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RELIEF FOR WANDERERS 
THE TRANSIENT SERVICE IN KANSAS, 1933~35 
PETER FEARON 
Located at the crossroads of America, Kansas 
had long experience of interstate migrants. For 
many decades armies of workers had entered 
the state to pursue the harvest of a number of 
crops, or to pick up whatever work was available 
on their way west in pursuit of a more reward-
ing life. The u.s. population was highly mobile 
and migration played an essential role in a 
vigorously expanding economy. Ailing tran-
sients, especially tubercular cases, had as their 
destination the pure, dry air of the Southwest. 
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To these we can add indeterminate numbers of 
seasonal workers, ex-veterans, homeless boys, 
peddlers, beggars, and rootless individuals, 
some of who had recently been discharged from 
prisons or from other institutions. 
People on the move usually traveled by 
horse-drawn prairie schooner, by rail, or made 
their way by hitchhiking. In the 1920s low-
priced used autos enabled many families to 
travel with relative ease over considerable dis-
tances'! Migrants, however, were often unpre-
pared for the rigors of their journey, and they 
inevitably presented a local welfare problem 
when their resources were totally exhausted 
and they were forced to seek public relief.2 
Before the New Deal made federal funding 
available, poor relief in the United States was 
firmly based on the principle of local delega-
tion, and in most states responsibility for assist-
ing the poor was delegated to the county in 
which they had legal settlement.3 For example, 
in Kansas, legal settlement was gained by resi-
dence in a county for a minimum of six months, 
but it was lost if there was a deliberate absence 
of six months or if settlement was gained else-
where. Local responsibility was considered an 
important means of targeting relief to those 
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who deserved it and of safeguarding against 
excessive expenditure.4 Nonresident destitutes 
who were forced to ask for assistance got little 
help from Kansas counties, which, before 1929, 
allocated less than 1 percent of their annual 
relief expenditures to supplicants who had no 
legal settlement.5 Spurned by county officials, 
migrants often had to rely on private chari-
ties for emergency assistance to avoid extreme 
hardship. 
Even before the Great Depression began 
to squeeze the national economy, the scale of 
interstate migration was significant. A survey 
of sixty-three Kansas cities, undertaken in 
1929 by the League of Kansas Municipalities 
in cooperation with the Kansas Conference of 
Social Work, reported 6,949 transient cases. 
These cases included nearly two thousand 
families who traveled with approximately 
four thousand children whose education was 
severely disrupted and whose health was at risk. 
In addition, 13,437 single men and 1,388 single 
women were assisted. The figures seriously 
underestimated the total, as only one prison 
was included in this survey, yet city and county 
jails played a very important role in providing 
shelter for single migrants.6 
Once the national economy went into 
a steep decline, the numbers of transients 
rose but no systematic attempt was made to 
record their numbers across the state. Pockets 
of information, usually from centers where 
trained social workers were trying to cope with 
the situation, provide evidence of a mounting 
welfare problem that was replicated throughout 
the nation. For example, during the winter of 
1931-32, the shelter maintained by the Topeka 
Provident Association was filled each night to 
its capacity of twenty-two. When the tempera-
ture dropped to levels that created a danger 
to rough sleepers, the local prison housed an 
additional forty. For the calendar year 1931, the 
Provident Association provided 13,142 meals 
and 4,373 beds, a big increase when compared 
with 7,222 meals and 1,826 beds that had been 
needed during the previous year. 
Throughout the state it was increasingly 
evident that welfare provision for residents 
was grossly inadequate and that the additional 
problem posed by migrants was becoming more 
acuteJ Evidence of this mounting welfare crisis 
was provided by the Family Welfare Society 
in Wichita, which could only offer shelter to 
between ten and seventeen homeless people 
each night during the severe winter weather 
of 1930-31. There were very few dedicated 
shelters for the homeless; for those who could 
not find a place in dorms run by charities or 
in boiler rooms or grain elevators, the usual 
escape from the weather was the local jail. 
Homeless unemployed men and boys found on 
the streets by the police were often "vagged," 
that is, arrested, kept overnight in the cells, and 
then sent on their way next morning without 
charge. In December 1930, police in Wichita 
arrested 450 persons for vagrancy but virtually 
all of them were released without charge after a 
night in jail with an injunction to leave town. 
During the winter of 1931-32 the police rescued 
similar numbers.8 Prison accommodation was 
overcrowded, uncomfortable, and unhygienic 
but preferable to spending a night on the street 
in subzero temperatures. However, although 
newspapers and a cardboard box were the 
summer choice of many rough sleepers, that 
was not true for all. Over 650 migrants spent 
the night in Wichita's jail during June 1931, the 
overwhelming majority having been arrested 
for vagrancy. 
All Kansas residents were aware of the grow-
ing strain that the depression was imposing 
on their county's relief budget, and the over-
whelming majority of taxpayers believed that 
charity begins and ends at home. Strangers 
were often regarded contemptuously as "bums" 
or "scroungers" if they asked for assistance; 
however, if they sought work they were accused 
of stealing scarce jobs from locals who should 
always have priority.9 This prejudice was 
widespread, even though in 1930 45 percent 
of the residents of Kansas cities and 27 per-
cent of the state's farmers had migrated from 
another state.I° According to contemporary 
sociologist Robert S. Wilson, counties dealt 
with interstate migrants in a variety of ways. 
The majority of them favored "Passing On," 
where in an emergency transients were given 
a small allocation of gas and a little food but 
no offer of accommodation; recipients were 
then urged to leave for somewhere, indeed 
anywhere, else. "Threatening On" involved a 
more aggressive approach, usually on the part 
of the police. Transients were threatened with 
imprisonment or some other assault on their 
civil liberties if they did not leave town imme-
diately. "Indiscriminate Haphazard Relief" was 
kindly meant but fundamentally unwise. Retail 
stores and private individuals gave handouts to 
all the seemingly needy that called, and private 
charities gave assistance without coordinating 
their activities or engaging in any social inves-
tigation of applicants.!! Skilful mendicants 
were able to exploit the system and inform the 
likeminded of the easy pickings available. 
There were few examples of a fourth 
approach, "Constructive Assistance and 
Centralized Responsibility." Only the family 
welfare societies in Wichita, Topeka, and 
Kansas City, Kansas, together with the Red 
Cross agencies at McPherson, Dodge City, 
Independence, Parsons, and Atchison, employed 
the full-time trained social workers that could 
provide the professional welfare service that 
transients required. In these centers, social 
workers attempted, through a series of inter-
views, to construct a plan that would either 
return the transients to their place of origin 
or help them move on to a suitable destina-
tion.1 2 These isolated examples of excellent 
practice were crucial in framing the plan that 
Kansas submitted to the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration (FERA) to secure fund-
ing for the establishment of a State Transient 
Service. 
Unemployment, inadequate relief, the cata-
strophic fall in farm prices, drought, and the 
inability of marginal farm families to secure the 
part-time work that was necessary to prevent 
utter destitution were the key factors pushing 
migrationP The prospect of a job in a distant 
place, or the security of being close to rela-
tives, were significant elements pulling travel-
ers toward a new life.14 It was inevitable that 
some would have to beg for assistance while 
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on the road or when they reached their final 
destinations but were not entitled to resident 
relief. There was a clear need for a federal pro-
gram that would offer assistance to vulnerable 
travelers who had no legal claim to local assis-
tance. This lifeline was provided by the FERA 
through one of its special emergency relief 
programs. The FERA was the key New Deal 
relief agency during the period 1933-35 and it 
was responsible for distributing over $3.0 bil-
lion in grants to the states to assist the needy. 
This sum represented approximately 70 percent 
of the entire expenditure on emergency relief 
during these years.!S 
Because of this New Deal initiative, for the 
first time in U.S. history federal grants became 
available for the relief of needy people who 
had no legal residence in anyone state or com-
munity.!6 A Transient Division was created 
within the FER A in order to establish a nation-
wide program to assist transients, defined as 
persons who had resided for less than twelve 
consecutive months in the state where they 
applied for reliefP In order to secure funding, 
all states were required to cooperate with the 
federal government in the creation of a spe-
cially designed administrative structure that 
would help stabilize the lives of needy migrants 
who fell into this category. The provision of 
public assistance for needy people on the move 
who could not meet this minimum residence 
requirement was a radical departure from 
past practice and it was a farsighted and bold 
experiment. 
By analyzing the provision of aid to tran-
sients in Kansas, this article provides a fresh 
insight into a neglected New Deal initiative. 
Indeed, the transient program is ignored in 
virtually all the texts used in university history 
courses.!S The aims of the transient service, how 
it operated, and how effective it was in meet-
ing the demands placed upon its are significant 
issues that can be effectively explored at the 
state level. Other crucial questions include: Did 
this initiative encourage interstate migration 
rather than curtail it? How effective was the 
transient program in identifying the causes of 
transiency and resolving them? Were families 
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and single migrants successfully stabilized, and 
if so, how many fell into this category? Did 
the work undertaken by transients, especially 
those living in camps, adequately equip them 
for private-sector employment? If the Transient 
Service was effective, why was it terminated in 
1935? 
Kansas provides a particularly interest-
ing political framework for a case study. 
Between 1933 and 1936 the state had in Alf 
Landon a Republican governor who, in 1936, 
was Roosevelt's principal opponent in the 
race for the White House. There was also a 
Republican majority in the state legislature. 
Kansas Republicans strove with all their might 
to attract federal funds that accompanied the 
key New Deal initiatives.t9 However, not only 
did the Republicans manage New Deal relief 
policies in the "Sunflower State," they did 
so remarkably effectively. During the period 
in question, experienced federal field officers 
frequently testified that Kansas had one of 
the most efficient relief administrations in 
the country.20 The testimony of federal field 
officers has to be taken seriously. These agents 
were highly experienced professionals who pro-
vided their Washington masters with a frank 
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the relief administrations in the states where 
they exercised responsibility.21 The praise 
the Kansas relief administration attracted for 
managing the FERA and the Civil Works 
Administration (CWA) was clear and unam-
biguous. 22 An examination of the Transient 
Service in Kansas provides a microcosm of best 
practice that New Deal officials hoped to see in 
every state. 
ThE KANSAS TRANSIENT SERVICE 
In July 1933 the FER A invited states to 
register their plans for the establishment of 
a transient service. Each plan had to provide 
detailed information on the extent and the 
nature of the problem that migrants posed, 
indicate how these problems would be tackled, 
and also give an estimate of the cost of the 
proposals. The federal government indicated 
that states should establish a central facility 
for the registration of transients, where they 
would immediately be assigned to a social 
worker who would provide full casework facili-
ties. Bona fide transients could expect food, 
shelter, and clothing to be provided according 
to their needs. They would also receive medical 
attention. Transport would be available to take 
them either to their place of legal residence 
or to another location that would be decided 
on after consultation with a social worker. It 
was stressed that "passing on" was a thing of 
the past. A return to a place of legal residence 
would take place only with the cooperation 
of the migrants and within the framework 
of interstate agreements. There would be no 
undue pressure on transients to return from 
whence they came, as the care given to them 
would not have a time limit. Finally, suitable 
employment provided through local work 
projects, or resulting from registration with 
employment bureaus, was an essential part 
of the plan. Seasonal migratory workers were 
not considered transients, and nor were intra-
state migrants or the state's homeless; all were 
judged a local responsibility.23 
Although the relationship between the 
FERA and the states was a partnership, the 
states were obliged to fulfill certain conditions 
before they could claim their cash grants. For 
example, each had to start collecting statisti-
cal information that could be transmitted to 
Washington in the form requested. This data 
eventually made possible the creation of an 
accurate picture of the transient problem across 
the nation, whereas previously, estimates of 
the numbers of migrants had varied consider-
ably and most were wildly inaccurate.24 It also 
provided the basis for several valuable and 
innovative empirical studies on the causes and 
the effects of transiency.25 The FERA had great 
faith in the benefits of social casework, and 
states were urged to transform wanderers into 
clients. We can also note the New Deal horror 
of dole payments, which, it was believed, would 
lead to dependency.26 Where possible, those fit 
for work were supposed to perform useful tasks 
rather than luxuriate in idleness. Transients 
were excluded by law from employment in 
the Public Works Administration (PWA) and 
CWA programs, but officials hoped that tran-
sients would find sufficient work, or work relief, 
locally. New Deal officials were in no doubt 
that assistance for transients through a program 
specifically dedicated to them was essential if 
local prejudice was to be avoided. However, 
they were also anxious to avoid the natural 
resentment that would arise if migrants were 
judged to be treated too favorably. The assess-
ment of their need by trained social workers 
was the means by which equality of treatment 
could be assured.27 It was not anticipated that 
distress-induced migration would be curtailed 
solely by the activities of the Transient Service 
but as a result of various New Deal programs, 
some of which were designed to assist farmers, 
others to generate more jobs through economic 
recovery, and for the less fortunate, to provide 
more generous relief to those who remained at 
home. 
There was little enthusiasm in Kansas about 
extending care to transients, on the grounds 
that the inevitable result would be even more 
wanderers applying for assistance.2s However, 
the state relief administration, encouraged by 
the prospect of federal funding, acted quickly. 
Using as a guide the "Alabama Plan," one of 
the few that had already been approved by the 
FERA, the state's submission was dispatched 
on September 7. 29 Within two weeks the 
FERA had approved the plan and had agreed, 
initially, to provide a monthly grant of fifteen 
thousand dollars. A week later, Gerard F. 
Price was appointed as state supervisor of the 
Transient Division of the Kansas Emergency 
Relief Committee (KERC). 
Price first instituted a survey in order to 
determine the number of transients, their loca-
tion, and the facilities currently available for 
their care and rehabilitation. The next step was 
to establish the new administrative structure 
that had been agreed with the FERA, which 
required the creation of two types of service 
centers and also camps that would form part 
of a national network. Reference Centers were 
established in each of the state's 105 counties 
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under the direction of the poor commissioner, 
who was made responsible for the direct super-
vision of resident cases. Reference Centers 
became the first port of call for transients. 
After registration, each migrant received 
immediate but temporary care, which included 
food and lodging, and had the opportunity to 
meet a social worker. The next step was the 
referral of families, single men, and boys to a 
treatment center where the process of rehabili-
tation would begin. At the treatment center, 
families and individuals received a medical 
examination, accommodation was provided, 
and work began on a plan that was intended to 
bring their wandering to a halt. The rehabilita-
tion of each client to the point of self-sufficient 
stability was seen as an essential part of the 
service offered by the Transient Division. 
Reference Centers offered primary help at 
the point of registration without requiring the 
transients to travel immediately to a treatment 
center.30 Verification by the State Registration 
Bureau that the family or individual qualified 
as bona fide indigent interstate transients was 
necessary before relief could be offered on other 
than a temporary basis. Like all New Deal relief 
programs, assistance to transients was means 
tested. On the receipt of a clearing return 
from the Registration Bureau, transients who 
had a legal settlement elsewhere were urged to 
return to their homes and offered assistance 
with transport costs to make this option more 
appealing. Or they would be given help to plan 
their onward migration, which would involve 
identifying the transient help available in 
other states. If neither option was possible, 
they, and those who had lost settlement, were 
referred to a treatment center. Transport to 
the center could be provided but only after an 
agreed amount of work had been undertaken 
to cover the cost. The information gathered 
by the transient survey instituted by Gerard 
Price was used to determine the location of 
each treatment center, where care was orga-
nized while social workers and clients worked 
together on a stabilization plan. 
Separate treatment centers were established 
for both families and single males, though 
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single females and boys less than fourteen years 
of age were accommodated in family centers. 
The family centers were supervised by trained 
social workers but the transient families were 
lodged in houses in various parts of the towns 
in which the centers were located. The laud-
able aim was to integrate transient families 
with their neighbors and to avoid segregation 
that would make transition to a stable life more 
difficult. Unattached males, on the other hand, 
were lodged in single buildings near places 
where they might find work. Strenuous efforts 
were made to find appropriate, continuous work 
for all transients who were considered fit for 
employment. The significance of regular work 
in the path toward a normal life was stressed 
by the FERA and was echoed by all Kansas 
officials. Indeed, the FERA proposal was that 
all able-bodied transients should perform thirty 
hours of work each week in exchange for their 
subsistence and a small cash allowance.3! The 
first family treatment center was opened in 
Wichita on November 1, 1933, and others fol-
lowed it in Kansas City and Topeka. Single 
males benefited from the opening on November 
22 of the Railroad YMCA building in Topeka, 
a gift of the Santa Fe Railroad, and soon after-
ward, that of another center at Fort Scott. 
The general principles and aspirations of 
the Kansas Transient Division were clear. 
There would be no more "passing on," nor 
would there be a limitation to relief arbitrarily 
imposed by untrained and unsympathetic offi-
cials anxious to appease local taxpayers. It was 
now recognized that the key to successful work 
with transients was stabilization, which could 
mean a return to their place of legal settlement 
or a move to a new location where the chances 
of economic and social survival seemed good, 
or if all else failed, care within the state of 
Kansas. Stabilization, however, was not viewed 
as an easy option; it was only possible if clients 
gave their full cooperation and if they had the 
assistance of skilled caseworkers. Kansas wel-
fare professionals hoped that other states would 
provide at least as high standards for the care of 
their residents on relief as was made available 
to travelers by the Kansas Transient Division so 
that the incentive to take to the road could be 
minimized.32 
At the close of 1934 there were nine treat-
ment centers for unattached males, of which four 
were work camps, located at the Wabaunsee, 
Howard, Sedan, and Gardner Lake projects. 
When the program ended in September 1935, 
the three family treatment centers were part 
of a sixteen-center operation, which included 
a transient's hospital in Topeka. In January 
1934, a total of 310 families and 3,737 unat-
tached men and women were assisted by the 
state Transient Service. These numbers swelled 
to an annual peak in December of 1,436 fami-
lies (of which 1,322 were assisted by the three 
family treatment centers) and 11,523 unat-
tached persons. During 1935 a monthly average 
of 14,523 nonresidents were cared for. Monthly 
figures show marked fluctuations because of the 
influence of the weather, the onset of school 
vacations, which influenced family travel, 
and of course, the closure of the program in 
September 1935. However, the number of 
families assisted reached a 1935 peak of 2,475 
in July, while the unattached, at 16,824, were at 
their most numerous in March.33 These figures, 
and those collected nationally, understate the 
number of transients because they are limited 
to travelers who registered at centers. It is not 
possible to calculate the numbers of migrants 
who for various reasons refused to ask for assis-
tance from the Transient Division. 
By October 1934, all states with the excep-
tion of Vermont were participants in the 
Federal Transient Program. One benefit of this 
universal approach was that it introduced a 
regular count of assisted transients through a 
mid-monthly census, which allows the Kansas 
experience to be put in perspective. The 
national peak for transient families occurred 
during February and March 1935 when just 
over forty thousand were recorded. The count 
of unattached individuals reached a high point 
in December 1934 with 160,523, of whom 5,004 
were women. The total cost of the transient 
program to the taxpayer was $106.1 million 
out of which Kansas secured $2.1 million. This 
was a similar sum to that received by Colorado, 
nearly double the grant received by Oklahoma 
and Nebraska but less than the $3.5 million 
awarded to Missouri.34 To put this in perspec-
tive, during 1934 Kansas transients were cared 
for at an average cost of 18 cents per day and 
during that year travelers received $91,906 in 
cash wages while the value of their relief in 
kind was assessed at $427,231,35 
CARE FOR MIGRANT FAMILIES 
The survey undertaken at the request of 
Gerard Price in late 1933 had shown that the 
provision of aid for all transients was poor, but 
it was the lack of care offered to families that 
posed the biggest welfare risk. These findings 
persuaded officials that family care should be 
a priority. The three family treatment centers 
were, therefore, situated in the most urbanized 
parts of the state, a logical outcome of the 
decision to place transient families in private 
houses where they could experience not only 
the stabilizing influence of home life but could 
also enter into community activities. Large 
cities were the only places that combined a 
sufficient number of homes to rent with the 
opportunity for suitable work relief. Since the 
Transient Service was able to pay relatively 
high rents, the provision of suitable housing 
was never a problem.36 Social workers hoped 
that the family treatment centers and the 
county relief administrations could be amal-
gamated, but it was soon clear that this addi-
tional burden would be too much for county 
organizations that were struggling to cope with 
a big increase in resident cases. Transient relief, 
therefore, remained a separate category, much 
to the regret of officials who feared that this dis-
tinction would stigmatize nonresidents.37 The 
integration of transients and residents in their 
communities was considered a priority by social 
workers as they strove to stabilize the former and 
it was unfortunate, although unavoidable, that 
this crucial relationship was compromised by 
the separation of relief organizations. 
The treatment centers created the oppor-
tunity for caseworkers to embark upon a full 
investigation of their clients. They also provided 
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families with the opportunity to avail them-
selves of a range of medical services that few 
had previously encountered. Most migrant 
families came from Oklahoma, Texas, Missouri, 
and Arkansas, where relief was neither as well 
organized as it was in Kansas nor, according 
to Kansas officials, as generous. In particular, 
travelers should have been impressed by the 
medical services available at the treatment 
centers. A small medical unit was provided in 
each center where sick cases could be isolated 
and where acute illnesses such as pneumonia 
could receive bedside nursing. During 1934, 
7,380 people received medical attention at the 
family treatment centers; of these, 2,339 were 
vaccinated and 2,051 were immunized. All 
transients were given typhoid jabs; those under 
twelve years of age received diphtheria toxin. 
Serious infectious diseases, for example tuber-
culosis or venereal disease, could be identified 
and the sufferers offered treatment or isolation. 
During 1934 alone, 386 syphilitics were diag-
nosed at the family treatment centers.38 Dental 
care had been sadly neglected but now large 
numbers of people were able to enjoy relief 
after years of suffering. The Transient Service 
also provided dentures, although only to those 
younger men who were best placed in the job 
market, and they were given the opportunity 
to work extra hours to· pay for the dental treat-
ment they received.39 
The Transient Service was also obliged 
to help the victims of a number of accident 
cases. As neither the railroads nor the coun-
ties would accept responsibility for migrants 
injured on their property, the cost of caring 
for them fell on the Transient Service. A 
small hospital was opened in Topeka in 
January 1935 and was made available to tran-
sients throughout the state; during the twelve 
months of its existence, it had an average daily 
load of twenty-six patients. The medical assis-
tance available for all categories of transients 
and was not limited to accident cases. High-
quality medical care was of great benefit to a 
group in poor general health, few of whom had 
been previously subject to systematic scrutiny 
by doctors and nurses. 
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Until October 1934, transient families 
received relief only in kind. Family heads who 
were able to work performed various assigned 
tasks and in return had their utility bills and 
rent paid, groceries issued to them at a grocery 
store, and clothing purchased for their families. 
Once it was clear to social workers that some 
families wanted to stop wandering and remain 
in one location, they supported the introduc-
tion of a system of cash relief. Willing and 
able men were given work relief on exactly the 
same budgetary deficiency basis used for FERA 
resident cases in the counties. Family resources 
and needs were assessed by social workers and 
sufficient hours of work were allocated, up to a 
maximum of thirty, so that at least part of the 
deficiency gap could be bridged. To cut down on 
administrative costs and to assist the rehabili-
tative process, clients who had the appropriate 
skills were also used as clerks, stenographers, 
or as janitors and general laborers. In fact, if 
clients were suitably qualified for any particular 
task they were given employment, though not 
at the cost of them securing private jobs if any 
became available. National and local officials 
stressed the morale-boosting effects of employ-
ment in a wide variety of occupations and the 
closer commitment to the program on the part 
of transients that resulted from their participa-
tion in it.40 
Females who headed households were also 
offered work, though the need to care for chil-
dren often proved a major obstacle. If women 
had no office skills they were employed as 
cleaners or in sewing rooms set up for work 
relief. In Topeka, the women's sewing room 
used textile remnants to manufacture 2,030 
toys while men made 310 dolls that were given 
to the children of transients and to other 
relief families for Christmas 1934.41 Sewing-
room facilities enabled transient families to 
make their own clothing and look neater and 
more self-confident than was usual for relief 
clients. Employment on work projects played 
an important part in the rehabilitative process 
and gave transients the opportunity to appreci-
ate the demands and the limitation of family 
budgeting. However, work relief was only given 
to families who were physically and mentally 
equipped to cope with the tasks and who 
were also believed to have become stable. The 
others continued to receive direct relief.42 
The oddities of the settlement laws were 
irksome to social workers and puzzling to many 
residents. A special session of the Kansas 
Legislature held during October 1933 had made 
the state's settlement laws more restrictive. 
To be consistent with federal rules defining 
transients, a continuous residence of twelve 
months was required to gain settlement, but 
it could be lost by an absence of six months. 
In other words, native Kansans who had 
been absent from their county of settlement 
for over six months, and as a result had lost 
settlement rights, had to demonstrate con-
tinuous residence of twelve months in their 
new county in order to gain settlement. The 
result was that for a six-month period some 
mobile Kansans had no settlement rights in 
any state. Normally families in this predica-
ment continued to live in their new Kansas 
county instead of being sent to a family treat-
ment center. They remained there, still under 
the care of the State Transient Service but 
approved and budgeted for relief as if they 
were residents, until they qualified for settle-
ment. The general rule was that the counties 
took care of all intrastate transients and the 
federal centers were restricted to interstate 
cases only.43 However, the flexibility in the 
system was beneficial to Kansans without legal 
settlement in their own state. These families 
often had the support of relatives with whom 
they sometimes lodged, or they had friends in 
the community and there were better oppor-
tunities for employment. It made little sense 
to temporarily place rural families in a big city 
treatment center solely in order for them to 
gain legal settlement prior to a return to the 
countryside.44 Care in the counties was both 
a sensible and a cost-effective policy for those 
falling afoul of the settlement laws. However, 
where legal settlement outside Kansas could be 
verified, and there was good reason to encour-
age families to return to their former homes, 
this was done. During 1934 the three family 
treatment centers returned 652 families to their 
legal settlements.45 
TRANSIENT MEN 
Unattached men posed different problems 
to those generated by families. In contrast with 
other FERA activities, an important feature 
of the transient program was congregate and 
camp care, which was seen as the only way 
to deal with large numbers of homeless men, 
and the vast majority of them were cared for 
in this way.46 Several treatment centers for 
single males were located at the stopping points 
where the railroad routes, which carried about 
90 percent of single transients, were most 
likely to discharge their nonpaying passengers. 
Centers at Topeka, Fort Scott, Hutchinson, 
Dodge City, and Liberal owed much to the 
popular practice of riding railcars. In mid-1934, 
however, only the Rock Island Railroad had 
failed to significantly curb free riders, and that 
line then provided a relatively large numbers 
of transients.47 By the spring of 1935 railroad 
travel had been so significantly reduced that 
treatment centers in Belleville, Herrington, 
and Liberal were closed down.48 By the middle 
of 1935, one-third of travelers were using the 
highway.49 Auto dealers who wanted vehicles 
delivered to distant destinations provided a 
seemingly attractive and cheap means of travel 
for some men to move west but unfortunately, 
delivery drivers could be stranded on arrivapo 
Every effort was made to avoid locating the 
congregate treatment centers in the most unsa-
vory urban environment where clients would 
be exposed to temptations of the flesh and of 
the bottle. However, while officials sought sites 
they thought would boost the morale of their 
clients and contribute to their stabilization 
program, local people worried about the effect 
of large numbers of homeless men on property 
values and even on personal safety.51 Moreover, 
the transients were also seen as competitors for 
both private employment and for relief work. 
State officials, however, were imaginative and 
relatively successful in their attempts to pacify 
local opposition. Public meetings were held 
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so that plans could be discussed with local 
residents at an early stage and the questions 
they found most problematic were answered. 
Sometimes a committee whose membership 
included residents was formed to try to iden-
tify suitable premises for a treatment center. If 
transients were to playa part in the community 
and not become isolated, it was essential that 
relationships with local people were cordial. 
When centers opened, it was customary for 
representatives of local civic groups and reli-
gious leaders to be invited for a meal. For a 
small charge the standard institutional fare 
was provided; attendance was usually very high 
and reports indicate that the visitors were suit-
ably impressed. Senior officials believed that 
"housewarmings" and the general emphasis on 
community relationships helped protect the 
transient service from potentially destructive 
criticism. 52 
Staff at the centers were convinced that 
the development of self-respect and confidence 
on the part of each transient was an essential 
prerequisite if a nomadic life was to be aban-
doned. The centers sought to inculcate new 
attitudes by ensuring that every man had his 
own bed rather than a canvas cot that would be 
allocated to a different person each night, that 
there was a high standard of cleanliness in the 
building, and that decent food and adequate 
washing facilities were also provided for clients. 
Lockers were available for personal possessions, 
and where possible, privacy was encouraged. 
Some men entered the center dirty, vermin-
ous and dressed in rags; stabilization required 
high levels of personal hygiene and adequate 
clothing, which was provided for them. All the 
sheets, pillowcases, and towels for the unat-
tached men's centers and the camps were made 
in the fully equipped sewing room set up in the 
Topeka family treatment center. 
It became obvious that the men actually 
enjoyed working to improve the building they 
occupied and that their spartan rooms could 
be transformed in a short space of time if 
the appropriate level of supervision and the 
materials were provided. The men also ben-
efited from a compulsory medical inspection 
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for all those registered as transients and from 
hospital services available at Topeka, Fort 
Scott, Hutchinson, and the Gardner Center 
and Wabaunsee camp, which treated a total 
of 2,246 patients in 1934.53 Many transients 
had been victims of self-neglect and had a low 
resistance to infectious disease. 54 These posi-
tive measures were designed to erase the worst 
aspects of institutional life so that the process 
of stabilization could begin with clients who 
had a respect both for their center and for the 
way in which it was run. The centers were not 
flophouses, but nor were they missions. 55 
After an initial interview with a caseworker, 
during which the client's skills and fitness 
for work were assessed, unattached men were 
encouraged to search for jobs locally. Although 
the labor market was depressed, they were 
sometimes successful, especially during the 
summer months when seasonal work became 
more readily available. Work projects were also 
set up for men who were fit for work but unable 
to find private-sector employment. They were 
employed on tasks such as construction, repair 
and maintenance in the centers, the demoli-
tion of public buildings, landscaping, public 
park improvements, and the maintenance and 
repair of the national cemetery at Fort Scott. 
The Topeka Board of Education employed 
about forty transient men as assistant janitors; 
others worked in the same capacity in the 
City Building. Unfortunately, Topeka labor 
union officers, who feared that relief workers 
would displace salaried janitors from their jobs, 
objected to this initiative so strongly that the 
transients were removed. 56 The usual difficulty 
for transients was that the public denounced 
them as scroungers if they did no work but if 
their search for public or private jobs was suc-
cessful, they were accused of taking employ-
ment away from deserving locals. The fact that 
transients were fed and housed only added to 
the resentment felt by their rivals in the search 
for scarce work. 
Lake construction projects provided the 
rationale for the four transient camps. The 
Transient Service set up both Wabaunsee 
and Gardner camps, and as many clients 
had experience in the construction industry, 
they were able to help with the erection of 
camp buildings. 57 Workers registered at the 
Topeka Treatment Center were transported 
to Wabaunsee each day in order to build a 
202-acre lake. The Gardner project involved 
transient clients building, under supervision, 
cabins, a water plant, and communal facili-
ties and also fitting electrical wiring and gas 
pipes. In September 1934, two mobile camps 
were established at Howard and Sedan. Both 
counties were desperately short of water and 
had begun to construct two lakes but could 
not recruit sufficient local relief labor to 
complete the work in the time allowed by the 
water conservation program. At the request 
of the KERC, the Transient Service provided 
an additional 100 men at Howard and 150 at 
Sedan, though the work was organized so that 
the local relief workers and the transients were 
employed on separate parts of each project. 
The rationale for this segregation is not clear, 
though the implication is that it was for rea-
sons of efficiency, not status. 58 By the end of 
1934, both dams were close to completion. 
All the centers and the camps developed 
well-organized leisure programs that eventu-
ally gave transients similar facilities to those 
available to the small-town dweller. During 
the winter months, when outside activities 
were curtailed, clients could use a recreation 
room to write letters, read, or play games. Local 
donations ensured that current newspapers 
and magazines were available to them rather 
than reading matter long out of date and close 
to disintegration. The larger camps showed 
movies and the more isolated camps opened 
commissaries, the profits from which were 
ploughed back into leisure activities, in one 
case helping to finance the purchase of caps 
and uniforms for baseball teams. 59 During the 
warmer months outdoor activities were avail-
able. Basketball, softball, volleyball, and even 
soccer teams competed in local community 
leagues. Perhaps if the Transient Program had 
continued for longer, the United States might 
have emerged as a world force in soccer, a truly 
international ballgame. A golf course was 
constructed at the Wabaunsee camp, which 
became a popular leisure facility for inhabit-
ants of the small town just a few miles distant. 
By encouraging these activities, and by making 
available the facilities of the camps to local 
people on special occasions such as the Fourth 
of July, the Transient Service and their clients 
made considerable progress in building bridges 
with their neighbors. In addition to games, 
a handicraft program was implemented so 
that old skills could be retained or new ones 
acquired. Each center and camp had a fully 
equipped workshop where clients were encour-
aged to produce small items for themselves. 
Before long it was apparent that high-qual-
ity furniture could be produced, and by late 
1934 over 80 percent of the office furniture of 
the State Transient office, the KERC offices, 
and those of other agencies had been made 
by transients on work projects.60 Five centers 
developed garden projects, which provided a 
supply of fresh vegetables and fruits. However, 
the Transient Service was always careful to 
preserve good community relations by ensur-
ing that local produce was purchased for its 
clients. Transients who, after social investiga-
tion, were permitted to do their own cooking 
became eligible for surplus commodities issued 
through the Surplus Products Division of the 
KERC. Those housed in camps were commu-
nally fed. 6l 
An attempt to combine leisure activities 
with work relief can be seen in the establish-
ment of five machine-sewing rooms in the 
family treatment centers where, under the 
direction of the local sewing project leadership, 
women who could not sew were taught, and 
those who could were given the opportunity 
to use their skills for the benefit of their fami-
lies. For example, mothers were encouraged to 
make clothing for their school-age children.62 
Experience had shown that some clients would 
send donated clothing to relatives who were 
in desperate circumstances; others would sell 
what they had been given and expect to be 
reissued with more. Family-made garments, 
perhaps because of a sense of ownership, were 
treated differently. 
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Nor was the education of the young neg-
lected. Children from the family treatment 
centers attended school along with the offspring 
of neighboring residents, which was seen as an 
important bonding element in their new rela-
tionship with the community. Their presence 
was perfectly acceptable to the boards of educa-
tion in all three towns. This harmony relied 
on a combination of Kansas law that obliged 
all children residing in the state for more than 
thirty days to attend school and the fact that 
good relations between the centers and their 
neighbors had been established at an early stage. 
Even young men who were in congregate care 
were able to use community education facilities. 
A few were fortunate enough to be awarded 
scholarships that enabled them to attend high 
school, grade school, or even business school. 
Suitable scholars were given direct relief.63 
Work camps also provided a public ser-
vice in accepting parolees from the State 
Penitentiary and the Boys' Industrial School. 
Prisoners eligible for parole who had been 
transients at the time of their arrest but who 
had neither legal settlement in Kansas, nor 
relatives living in the state, nor the promise of a 
job, could not be paroled. An arrangement was 
made with the Parole Board for the Transient 
Service to admit to one of its camps men who 
they judged had a good chance of adjustment to 
civilian life given the appropriate support. The 
camps were seen as the ideal halfway house 
for those due for release from prison but who 
could not be legally paroled. Thus, in February 
1934, the Transient Service accepted sixteen 
males who had been paroled from Leavenworth 
prison. Very few men were involved in this 
experiment, which in any case lasted for such 
a short period that it is not possible to make a 
definitive evaluation of it, but it provides an 
example of the Transient Service cooperating 
with other state bodies and demonstrating a 
willingness to open its facilities to a potentially 
troublesome group that it could have ignored. 
Conviviality was not always evident in the 
relations between local relief officials and New 
Dealers in Washington. To the intense irrita-
tion of Washington-based officials, the burial 
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of nonresidents was a subject of continuous 
bickering between the Transient Service and 
county relief committees. When a transient 
died who had no next-oF-kin to take care of 
the funeral expenses, the charge of burial 
fell upon the local relief administration. This 
aroused great resentment on the part of the 
relief authorities, who protested that because 
they had not encouraged transients to come 
to their county centers, they saw no reason 
why the financial responsibility for interment 
should be theirs. The complaints, which were 
typically couched in pompous and indignant 
language, were contemptuously dismissed by 
Washington officials whose view was that, as 
the federal government had given substantial 
assistance to all counties through various New 
Deal programs, the attempt of county commis-
sioners to avoid their rightful responsibilities 
over such small sums was shameful.64 
THE CLOSURE OF THE TRANSIENT SERVICE 
During 1935 Congress approved a radical 
reappraisal of the nation's welfare program. 
Following a major reorganization of priorities, 
the federal government decided to end its com-
mitment to emergency relief and to disband the 
FERA. Since unemployment was a national 
problem, Washington declared its intention to 
take responsibility for the nation's employable 
persons in need of jobs. A new agency, the 
Works Progress Administration (WPA), was 
created to provide suitable work relief for needy 
household heads who fell into this category.65 
In other words, Washington made a clear dis-
tinction between those capable of work and 
those who, for various reasons, could not be 
employed. These unemployables became the 
responsibility of the states or counties where 
they had residence. Emergency federal relief 
grants to the states were terminated, and as a 
result, the funding for the transient program 
disappeared. The federal plan was that from 
late 1935, able-bodied transients in need would 
become eligible for relief work from the newly 
formed WPA, while the care of needy transient 
unemployables would be assumed by the county 
in which they resided, or more accurately 
the one in which they had legal settlement. 
Although the transient camps were popular 
with both Kansas officials and the public, in 
the eyes of senior Washington officials they 
were unacceptable because they inevitably led 
to segregation. In Harry Hopkins's own words: 
"[Tjransient camps under the WPA came to an 
end because of the strong conviction that their 
psychology was not consistent with the aims 
of the work program. The final victory for the 
transient is only won when, working side by 
side with the local man, he is known simply as 
a good workman worthy of his hire."66 
The realization that once the program was 
wound up some transients would gain legal set-
tlement and become Kansas residents attracted 
a hostile reaction. The Hutchinson News 
reported that Ford, Reno, and Shawnee county 
commissioners had declared that they had "no 
intention of supporting the federal cast-offs."67 
Ford county commissioner A. P. Henthorn 
was quoted in the Norton Telegram as saying, 
"[W]e have too many local people in need to 
spend any county money on transients.,,68 The 
prospect of travelers working on relief projects 
alongside residents of long standing was not 
one that many communities relished. However, 
although residence was not supposed to affect 
WPA eligibility, in fact it did once the period of 
transition from the transient service had been 
completed. It was not sufficient to be unem-
ployed to become eligible for WPA employ-
ment. Successful applicants had to be both 
jobless and certified in need of relief after a full 
investigation by a social worker. It was easy for 
local officials to make life difficult for migrants 
by refusing to accept certifications of relief 
eligibility made elsewhere and insisting on a 
new, and naturally lengthy, investigation. Even 
more significant was the requirement that for 
WPA certification, applicants had to be eligible 
for relief. But to become eligible all applicants 
had to live in a Kansas county continuously for 
one year. Only then would the state's residence 
requirements be met.69 Moreover, WPA proj-
ects had to be supported by substantial contri-
butions (usually 25 percent of the cost) from 
sponsors, who were usually the counties. Little 
wonder that under these circumstances taxpay-
ers believed that locals should be given prior-
ity for WPA work. Outsiders faced a further 
handicap. Federal funding was never sufficient 
to provide work for more than approximately 
40 percent of the men and women eligible 
for WPA jobs. The heads of transient fami-
lies, followed by single transients, were at the 
very bottom of the list of those considered for 
scarce WPA employment. Outsiders were at 
the mercy of county relief administrations or 
the goodwill of private charities. County and 
charitable relief was always less generous than 
federal assistance, and was usually given in 
kind rather than cash. 
The liquidation of the Kansas Transient 
Service began on September 20, 1935, when, 
as the following figures show, the demands for 
its services were still buoyant. During 1935 a 
monthly average of 1,743 families (comprising 
6,106 individuals) and 8,730 unattached non-
residents were assisted; $219,356 was paid in 
cash wages and the value of relief in kind was 
calculated at $402,202. One measure of how 
generously transients were treated was that 
some were able to start small savings accounts, 
which ultimately facilitated a move to private 
employment and personal budget manage-
ment.7° However, once the registration of new 
transients ceased, the state organization had 
to be run down, but at a speed consistent with 
the need to offer aid for those still legitimately 
under the service's care. Families became cash 
relief clients, each receiving a weekly check to 
cover their needs. Those heads of families who 
were fit for work were, in theory, available for 
assignment to the WPA on the same basis as 
residents; by the beginning of 1936, 70 percent 
had been placed, though it is important to note 
that most of the transients who were engaged 
by the WPA lived and worked in camps. In 
other words, they were retained to work on 
projects that had been underway for some 
time and whose distant location lessened the 
competition from the local unemployed. Some 
transient family heads were unable to work 
because of old age, sickness, or injury. And 
RELIEF FOR WANDERERS 257 
some mothers who headed households were 
unavailable for full-time employment because 
of the demands of their children. These clients 
ultimately became a county responsibility. 
An extra effort was made to return tran-
sients who had a legal settlement outside 
Kansas; during 1935, 364 families, 38 men, and 
69 women and girls who fell into this category 
were removed. On the other hand, in October 
1935, 278 families who had gained legal settle-
ment by living in a Kansas county continuously 
for at least one year became the responsibility 
of their new county, which received a grant of 
funds toward their care. During each subse-
quent month, families were transferred to the 
counties as soon as they had acquired settle-
ment. However, as late as December 31, 656 
families still remained the responsibility of 
the Transient Service in the treatment centers 
and thirty-one in the counties. All the family 
treatment centers were closed on February 1, 
1936, but the Transient Service continued to 
fund the 230 remaining families until they had 
acquired legal settlement. By September, all 
were under the care of county organizations.71 
Single men were dealt with in a different 
manner. All the unemployables, about seventy 
in number and mostly aged, were brought to 
the Topeka center. They were, of course, not 
eligible for WPA work and would eventually 
become a county charge, after the exhaustion 
of the final grant that accompanied them. All 
the employables were transferred to the camps, 
where work continued on water conservation 
and other related schemes. In mid-1935 the 
work on the Dodge City Transient Camp was 
completed and in the fall the men were moved 
to Wabaunsee. The Sedan project was also 
finished and the men moved briefly to Howard 
and then on to Wabaunsee. In November, the 
WPA approved the continuation of the projects 
at Gardener, Wabaunsee, and Howard, thus 
enabling the men already working on them to 
prolong their employment. However, once these 
projects were competed, the men working on 
them became a county responsibility. 
A plea that the transient hospital in 
Topeka should continue as an infirmary with 
258 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, FALL 2006 
a responsibility for camp residents was rejected, 
so a decision had to be made about the future 
of hospital patients, many of whom either 
had, or would shortly gain, legal settlement 
on Shawnee County. As the county poor farm 
was full to capacity, a large mobile building was 
moved from a transient camp to the poor farm 
and transformed into a hospital. On January 
23, 1936, the remaining eight patients were 
transferred to it from the Topeka hospital, 
which was then closed. Between December 
1933 and the end of 1935, $31,894 was spent on 
the Topeka hospital and 519 hospital clients 
were admitted to it. A large but unrecorded 
number of outpatients were also treated over 
this two-year period.n The figures suggest that 
there was a continuing demand for this hospi-
tal service. 
AN EVALUATION 
At an early stage the Kansas Transient 
Service became one of the most highly regarded 
in the country. In 1934, T. J. Edmonds, an FERA 
field supervisor and an experienced observer of 
state relief programs, gave his seal of approval by 
commenting to Harry Hopkins, "[TJhis Kansas 
set-up looks awfully good to me.'>?} These obser-
vations are consistent with other comments 
from Edmonds and those of fellow field supervi-
sors who were very impressed with the way in 
which Kansas organized its relief for the welfare 
of residents and nonresidents under the FERA 
and the CWA,74 The emphasis on stabilizing 
clients, the appointment of highly qualified staff, 
and the imposition of a first-rate administrative 
structure combined to provide a highly efficient 
system of care. Unfortunately, even with such a 
praiseworthy program, which was meticulous in 
its recordkeeping, it is difficult to calculate just 
how many transients were actually stabilized. 
One can, however, appreciate some of the for-
midable problems facing caseworkers who tried 
to implement this ambitious plan. 
The fact that that many families and unat-
tached individuals firmly resisted plans to stabi-
lize them presented social workers with a serious 
problem. Some migrants used the strategy of 
applying for assistance at a reference center too 
late in the day to either be assigned work or be 
sent to a treatment center. They would be given 
supper, shelter for the night, and breakfast next 
morning, but despite promising to liaise with a 
caseworker, they just continued their journey,75 
A report on the operation of ten of the twelve 
treatment centers during the period January 1 
to December 21, 1934, which shows the average 
length of stay of transient families, is revealing. 
In the first place it is clear that there were great 
variations in the average length of stay. In five of 
the centers the percentage of clients staying for 
less than two days was 58, 90, 67, 68, and 77. Even 
in the treatment centers, a very high proportion 
of clients were short-term visitors and there-
fore could not be candidates for stabilization. 
Most long-term residents were housed at the 
Wabaunsee and Gardner camps, where 53 and 
48 percent of clients, respectively, remained for 
longer than one month. In contrast, the family 
treatment centers had a very rapid turnover of 
clients, with only a small proportion remaining 
for longer than four days,76 The conclusion must 
be that the majority of transients did not stay 
long enough for the stabilization process to be 
effective, except where the service was success-
ful in persuading clients to permanently return 
to their place of legal settlement. However, it is 
impossible to tell what proportion of families 
and single individuals who returned home actu-
ally stayed there. Nor is it possible to judge the 
success of a planned migration where Kansas 
was merely a stopping off point. Transient 
Service officials advised travelers on their route 
and told them where help was available, but 
there is no information on whether they reached 
their desired destination or whether stable self 
sufficiency was the outcome of their journey. 
Dedicated Kansas officials worked hard to 
provide a first-rate service for families on the 
move. These social workers were not naive. 
They were fully aware that the structure they 
had created could be, and was, abused. The 
"gasoline group," for example, always claimed 
to have no resources; they demanded gas and 
groceries but refused to cooperate in any sta-
bilization plans.77 Kansas was so well endowed 
with reference centers-one in each of the 
105 counties-that the service was ripe for 
exploitation. As the frustrated state director 
of Transient Services wrote, an increasing 
number of clients believed that Kansas "is the 
land where the coffee tree grows and the sand-
wiches hang from the twigs."78 He reported 
that men of all ages neglected to report to 
caseworkers and would only travel to treatment 
centers if the subsidized ride took them in the 
direction they wanted to go. Even then they did 
not turn up in the centers. 
It was natural that officials, who were trying 
to administer a system designed to reduce 
transiency, resented the behavior of those 
who seemed determined to undermine their 
efforts. They suspected that the program was 
actually encouraging government sponsored 
panhandling.79 During May 1934, for example, 
there seemed clear evidence that families were 
leaving their home states in order to take 
advantage of the Kansas Transient Service.80 
State officials claimed that migrants traveled to 
Kansas because they were convinced that the 
transient relief they would receive was far supe-
rior to the assistance that they could expect at 
home. Kansas investigators believed that the 
complaints of miserly relief assistance in some 
other states had substance. But a contributory 
factor could have been that the shame attached 
to relief, which made an application for assis-
tance intolerable at home, became bearable 
where anonymity was likely. 
For whatever reason, an economy drive was 
instituted in December 1934, and clients who 
had settlement elsewhere but had refused to 
return were allocated budgets that were the 
minimum they could have expected in their 
place of legal settlement.8l However, even this 
draconian experiment, which was not consis-
tent with the spirit of the Transient Service, 
did not lead to the anticipated exodus. Kansas 
officials found that relief administrations in 
other states were sometimes reluctant to accept 
returnees, even though they were legally 
responsible for them. Moreover, families who 
did return often found their relief so utterly 
miserly, or its delivery so long delayed, that they 
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had no incentive to stay but every incentive to 
lose legal settlement so that they would qualify 
for transient relief in Kansas. Repeated experi-
ences confirmed the suspicion that the high 
quality of service offered in Kansas contributed 
to the movement of many clients who were 
naturally desperate to escape abject misery, as 
well as those less driven by abject poverty, who 
were prepared to stay in "Uncle Sam's Hotels," 
as the increasing number of conservative crit-
ics called them, but were determined to resist 
all attempts at stabilization. 
Another problem that confronted both 
caseworkers and their clients was the lack 
of suitable work relief projects. All federally 
funded work relief was limited to activities that 
did not compete with private industry, which is 
why there was a great concentration on public 
construction. In a situation where there was a 
shortage of work relief for both resident and 
transient unemployed, locals bitterly resented 
the competition from outsiders. This was espe-
cially true after the termination of the CWA 
program in March 1934. Many of the jobless 
who had been employed by the CWA, which 
did not insist on an assessment by social work-
ers to establish need as a prerequisite, were not 
eligible for work relief under the FERA, which 
did. The resulting tension often led to a lack of 
cooperation between the transient service and 
county relief organizations as the latter held 
firmly to the view that outsiders should only be 
allocated scarce relief jobs once local demand 
had been fully satisfied. Many locals believed 
that as transients received bed and board, they 
already had a better deal than residents, and 
that this injustice would be compounded if 
they also pushed to the front of the line wait-
ing for work relief. 82 The fortunate employed 
used their labor organizations to object to 
the employment of transients, whom they 
suspected of not only taking away jobs from 
their unemployed union work mates, but also of 
giving employers the incentive to cut wages. 83 
It is easy to understand why officials favored 
camps for transients. They were distant from 
concentrations of unemployment, and that 
distance provided insulation against attack by 
260 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, FALL 2006 
organized labor. Moreover, within each camp 
there was a full range of tasks to be performed 
and therefore the skills of clients at all levels 
could be usefully employed. The electrician, 
the mason, the plumber, and the laborer not 
only found their metier; there was also an 
opportunity to teach men new skills. The 
drawback was that work relief was supposed to 
be an important element in a stabilization pro-
gram that required integration in the commu-
nity. The community spirit, however, seems to 
have been easier to achieve with families than 
with single men, though perhaps in the camps, 
with their relatively long stay, the residents had 
the compensation of achieving a greater sense 
of camaraderie. 
Even for families who were prepared to work 
out a plan with caseworkers, stabilization posed 
serious difficulties. Consider, for example, 
those clients who came from the backwoods of 
Missouri or Arkansas where they had endured 
a miserable life as tenant farmers. Perpetually 
in debt even though every member of the 
family worked, now broken by drought, poor 
health, and starvation levels of relief, they did 
not want to return to their former communi-
ties. Kansas social workers felt that it would be 
cruel to send seriously disadvantaged people 
back to a perpetually depressing lifestyle, but 
they were acutely aware that the transition to 
an unfamiliar urban life for poverty-stricken 
rural transients would also pose formidable 
problems.84 While the niceties of this dilemma 
were debated, rural clients who enjoyed the 
treatment centers were quick to encourage 
their relatives to join them, thus adding to the 
migration that the transient service was trying 
to contain. Meticulous casework was essential 
with poor rural families, many of whom would 
have benefited more from subsistence home-
steads than from urban work relief. 
With the demise of the Transient Service, 
accurate nationwide data on migration were no 
longer available. To get some indication of the 
extent of this ongoing problem, the U.S. Senate 
asked the states to gather information on 
transients for the month ofJune 1936. To meet 
with this request, administrators in eighty-six 
Kansas counties, the Salvation Army, and all 
private welfare agencies provided information 
on travelers, or at least those travelers who had 
requested assistance. Though not as robust as 
the data collected by the Transient Service, 
where the possibility of double counting was 
remote, it seems that for the month in ques-
tion, 271 families, most accompanied by chil-
dren, sought help from the counties. Of those, 
149 were successful in gaining assistance at a 
cost of only $515.15, of which less than half 
was allocated for food. Either the counties had 
become extremely parsimonious or the needs 
of these applicants were not very pressing. The 
former seems the more convincing explana-
tion. The counties also assisted 299 unattached 
males, but most of their expenses were to cover 
emergency medical care and hospitalization.85 
Migrants continued to flow into Kansas after 
the transient program was discontinued, but 
they were at the mercy of a county relief system 
that never considered them a high priority, or 
they were reliant upon the generosity of private 
charities. 
Virtually all states were conscious of the 
presence of migrants but few considered that 
their out-migration had contributed to the 
national problem. In spite of the influx of tran-
sients, and a surplus of births over deaths, the 
total population of Kansas declined by approxi-
mately eighty thousand persons between 1930 
and 1940, the first decline since census records 
began. In particular the state lost a dispropor-
tionate number of males and also young people, 
including families with children. During 
this period the state's farm population fell by 
approximately one hundred thousand, but 
those being driven from the family farm would 
find relatively few economic opportunities in 
urban Kansas. Many had to look out of state if 
they were to secure a future for themselves and 
their families. 86 An analysis of all the factors 
influencing the powerful push and pull factors, 
which strongly influenced so many potentially 
restless people throughout the 1930s, is beyond 
the scope of this paper.87 Nor, indeed, can we 
answer that very pertinent question, namely, 
why others similarly affected by economic 
misfortune opted to stay put. What is certain is 
that many of those who chose to move would 
need some targeted assistance along the way. 
A representative sample of 5,489 interstate 
migrant families selected from those who were 
receiving care in transient bureaus during the 
summer of 1935 provides an fascinating insight 
into the causes and the results of population 
movement. Although the sample is weighted 
toward urban families, as the bureaus were 
located in cities, and those who were least 
equipped to move on to a new destination, 
this statistical exercise is of value if the results 
are properly interpreted.88 Of 1,091 families in 
this sample who had migrated from Kansas, 
33 percent had done so because of unemploy-
ment, 17 percent because of farm failure, while 
ill health had persuaded 13 percent to move. 
In other words, the loss of a job was a more 
significant reason for migration than farm mis-
fortune. The 1,091 families originating from 
Kansas were found in the transient bureaus of 
thirty-four states, but the most significant loca-
tions were Colorado (335), California (193), 
and Missouri (149). It should be pointed out 
that Kansas gained more families than were 
lost, as the state's transient bureaus housed 
1,368 out-of-state families. Of these, the most 
significant sources were Arkansas with 124 
families, Missouri with 357, Oklahoma with 
343, and Texas with 93. These figures show 
that most family migration was over relatively 
short distances. 89 Unfortunately, the survey did 
not consider single migrants, whose profile was 
probably very different. 
The federal government provided Kansas 
with $2.1 million to finance the Transient 
Relief program, which was a relatively large 
sum. Funding for the other FERA Special 
Emergency Relief Programs to March 1937 was 
as follows: Rural Rehabilitation, $1.3 million; 
College Student Aid, $334,000; and Emergency 
Education, $265,000Yo There can be no doubt 
that the Transient Service in Kansas gave 
valuable help to needy people who otherwise 
would have received little or no assistance at 
a time when adverse economic circumstances 
acted as a force for mobility. Indeed, during 
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the two years of its operation, the national 
transient program assisted approximately two 
hundred thousand families containing about 
seven hundred thousand persons. The figures 
show that there was a sizeable constituency 
of needy nonresident families and individuals 
who could benefit from the professional assis-
tance offered by social workers in the struggle 
to stabilize their lives. It is hard to be fiercely 
critical of a well-intentioned program that 
had such a short life that its administrators 
had little opportunity to learn from mistakes. 
Kansas did provide a highly effective service 
for those who were prepared to avail them-
selves fully of it. A settled existence in Kansas, 
a return to their state of origin, or a planned 
onward migration was a favorable outcome for 
some families. However, it is evident that the 
majority of travelers, though it is not possible 
to say exactly how many, were prepared to use 
the Transient Service as a form of "passing on." 
There is also some evidence that the quality of 
service offered in Kansas acted as a magnet and 
attracted the needy. 
With the demise of the FERA, federal assis-
tance for needy migrants came to a halt and 
the responsibility for assistance was passed to 
the counties. It is not surprising that strangers 
were always a low priority in the distribution 
of welfare resources. As WPA funding was 
able to accommodate only about 40 percent of 
those eligible for relief employment, outsiders 
faced a considerable competitive disadvantage. 
Moreover, strict settlement rules ensured that 
if the residence requirements were not met, 
charitable handouts were all that transients 
could legitimately expect. Economically dis-
tressed migrants bore the heaviest cost of the 
transfer from the FERA to the WPA.91 From 
late 1935, indigent migrants were forced to turn 
once again to private relief agencies, or to the 
counties, or when all else failed, to begging. 
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